The success of the Internet is remarkable in light of the decentralized manner in which it is designed and operated. Unlike small scale networks, the Internet is built and controlled by a large number of disparate service providers who are not interested in any global optimization. Instead, providers simply seek to maximize their own profit by charging users for access to their service. Users themselves also behave selfishly, optimizing over price and quality of service. Game theory provides a natural framework for the study of such a situation. However, recent work in this area tends to focus on either the service providers or the network users, but not both. This paper introduces a new model for exploring the interaction of these two elements, in which network managers compete for users via prices and the quality of service provided. We study the extent to which competition between service providers hurts the overall social utility of the system. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of 24th annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on principles of distributed computing,
Introduction
One of the most surprising features of the Internet is how effectively it operates on a global scale, despite the fact that its various components (Autonomous Systems) are operated by separate service providers, each of whom seeks only to maximize their own income. A number of recent papers have considered competitive network design games as simple models of how selfish agents might construct such a network. These models tend to assume a static user population, typically with fixed demands. In this paper we address the fact that the potential network users are just as crucial to the construction of a network as the service providers. Network managers compete for users via prices and the quality of service provided. We propose a simple game to explore a basic question that arises in this situation: how is the quality of service affected when the service providers set prices so as to extract maximum profit? We consider the special case of a graph with parallel links (or scheduling parallel machines), where the quality of the service is modeled as delay that increases linearly with the congestion, and user demand is concave. For such a game, we show that a pure equilibrium exists, and we provide a constant factor bound on the price of anarchy. Intuitively, this means that in our network game, when players set prices competitively, the total social welfare of the resulting outcome is nearly optimal. More formally, consider any game G with a social welfare function U(·) mapping game states to real values. The price of anarchy is the maximium ratio of the social welfare of the optimal solution (that which maximizes U(·)) to that of a Nash equilibrium. We give an improved bound for the special case in which delay is a pure congestion effect (i.e., when delay is 0 with no congestion).
Selfish routing and network design are two important classes of network games that have received much attention in recent years. In work on selfish routing (or load balancing) [11-13, 17, 20-23] users in a network route their traffic selfishly with the aim of minimizing their latency. These papers show bounds on the price of anarchy for the games they consider. In these games the sole goal of the users is to minimize delay; in particular, the volume of demand is fixed (independent of the delay in the system), and the network is static, in that it does not try to effect routing behavior by changing the properties of its edges. In particular, edges do not charge prices for traffic.
Network games have also been used to try to understand the quality of networks built by selfish agents. The price of anarchy or price of stability for such network creation games were studied under a few related models [6, 7, 14] . Such network creation games aim to model the behavior of agents, such as Autonomous Systems, who seek to build a network. In all of these games, players may choose to build edges from an underlying network, and seek to form connections between designated nodes. These models implicitly assume that demand is fixed and not dependent on the properties of the contructed network. In particular, network design games typically cannot model congestion effects, so players are not discouraged from overloading links. Furthermore, all of these models assume that network builders want to simply build a cheap network satisfying their fixed demands, rather than maximizing their own income by charging users for access to this network.
The primary motivation of this paper is to develop a model that encompasses key aspects of both selfish routing and network design games. Our main result is a small constant upper bound on the price of anarchy in a game that combines profit-maximizing edge-pricing players with user demand that is sensitive to both prices and congestion. In our model, users perceive the quality of a route (path) in a network via a combination of prices and congestion. Edges have congestion sensitive delays, i.e., the time required to traverse an edge depends on the amount of traffic using it. To this extent, our model extends the work on selfish routing discussed above. However, we also assume that each edge is operated by a distinct selfish player, who can charge traffic for the use of that edge. Finally, we assume that user demand is affected by the quality of service provided, in that increasing prices and delays cause a decrease in user traffic. We assume that the edges set prices in a selfish manner, aiming to maximize their income. The goal of our work is to quantify the performance degradation caused by selfishness (the price of anarchy) in this model. We show that in the special case of networks with parallel links and linear delays, pure Nash equilibria exist and the price of anarchy is bounded by a small constant.
Model overview
We define a simple model that combines the issues mentioned above. We consider a network consisting of two nodes s and t, with k parallel links. Each link is controlled by a distinct player, who can charge users a price for access to her link. Users are infinitesimally small, i.e., they have no market power and are thus price-takers. One can view this game as modeling a type of selfish load balancing problem. Here the edges correspond to machines, and the users (or traffic) selfishly balance between them. Each machine has a load dependent delay and can charge a price to all users.
Link i (or machine i) has a latency (or delay) function i (x), indicating the delay experienced by a volume of x traffic using i. We primarily focus on strictly increasing linear latencies, i.e., i (x) = a i x + b i , where a i > 0 and b i ≥ 0. We assume that user experience in routing flow through link i depends on the sum of the price and the latency, which we call the disutility. More precisely, if player i charges p i and f i volume of flow uses link i, then that flow experiences a disutility of p i + i (f i ). Note that this implicitly assumes that users are homogenous in the following sense; all users trade off time and money identically. We assume that traffic routes itself selfishly, meaning that traffic will not route along one link if it can switch links and incur a lower disutility. As a result, all traffic necessarily experiences the same disutility.
Finally, we also assume that the total amount of traffic from s to t is dependent on the disutility that traffic experiences; as the disutility increases, the total amount of flow interested in routing from s to t decreases. This can be modeled by a demand function D(y), also referred to as the demand curve, which indicates the amount of flow willing to incur a disutility of y. We naturally assume that demand D(y) is decreasing in disutility y. We focus on demand curves that are continuous and concave. Different demand curves are used to model demand in different industries. A concave demand curve is applicable for modeling demand for a service with a comparable alternative (at a high enough price all users will switch to the alternate service).
For the purposes of this paper, it will be useful for us to consider the inverse of the demand function, u(x) = D −1 (x), which we call the disutility curve. This measures the disutility that will be tolerated by a volume of x flow. Equivalently, we can view u(x) as representing the marginal utility of flow given a total flow of x. Given our assumptions on D(y), u(x) is also decreasing and concave. For ease of exposition, we assume that u(x) is strictly decreasing, but this assumption can be dropped without substantially changing our results.
Formal game description
We now present a concrete definition of our game. A game instance is completely defined by a concave, strictly decreasing disutility curve u(x) and k strictly increasing linear latency functions 1 (x), . . . , k (x). A strategy for player i is a price p i ≥ 0, and we will use p to denote a vector of prices for all players. A price vector p, together with the disutility curve u(x), induce a flow vector f with the following properties.
For any
As we will see in Lemma 1, such a flow vector exists and is unique. Players seek to maximize their profit,
The flow conditions ensures that the users route traffic in accordance with our proposed model. The first condition guarantees that no infinitesimally small user can decrease its disutility by rerouting. As a consequence, all edges carrying a positive volume of flow necessarily share a common disutility d, and all other edges have disutility of at least d. The second condition states that the marginal utility of the routed flow matches the disutility experienced on all edges with positive flow. Since flows are uniquely determined by prices, players can anticipate the profit they will gather by charging any particular price, and thus the game is well defined. We say that a set of prices p is at Nash equilibrium if, for any player i, unilaterally changing her price from p i to p i (and thus inducing a new flow f ) does not yield a profit (π i = p i · f i ) greater than her original profit π i .
We are interested in measuring the social utility of a given outcome (vector of prices). For an outcome with prices p inducing total flow F = j f j , and disutility d, we define the social utility to be The first term accounts for players' profits, and the second term, which we refer to as user surplus represents the utility gathered by the traffic that gets routed. Equivalently, we can view U(p) as the total utility of the routed flow minus the utility lost due to latency, i.e., the net utility created. An example of an instance of the game with two links is shown in Fig. 1 . The social utility of this instance is indicated by the shaded area. We are interested in bounding the price of anarchy of this game. If p * is the set of prices that maximizes social utility, then the price of anarchy is the maximum possible ratio of
where the prices p range over the possible prices that are at Nash equilibrium. Note that the total area under u(x) provides an upper bound on the maximum possible social utility. However, to achieve this bound we would need to route the maximum possible traffic volume without incurring any delay. Furthermore, observe that the optimal prices p * are often non-zero, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , as price can be useful in discouraging traffic and hence limiting delay. We can think of our problem as a type of two-stage game where there are two types of players: the owners of the edges, and a continuum of infinitesimally small users with traffic. In the first stage, the edge-players set prices p i on edges. In the second stage, users route selfishly from the source to the sink with respect to new latencies i (x) + p i , where the volume of flow is dictated by the disutility curve. For the remainder of this paper, we will focus on the single-stage version of this game; the only players are the edge owners, who set prices and anticipate the resulting flow.
Our results
• We show that for our pricing game, in a network with parallel links, concave disutility and linear latency functions, there is always a pure Nash equilibrium.
• We bound the price of anarchy in this game by 4.65, even when latencies are relaxed to be convex. • In the special case when delay is exclusively a congestion effect, that is, all links have i (0) = 0, the price of anarchy is at most 3.125.
Related work
In our model traffic evaluates its experience via a combination of price and delay. Modelling traffic as experiencing disutility in terms of price and delay has been studied in the transportation literature as early as in 1920 [19] (see also [8] ) and more recently in a sequence of papers started by Cole et al. [9, 10] (see also [15, 16] ). These works view prices as a tax that is set by a benevolent network manager so as to improve network performance. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [3] consider a version of our pricing problem in a monopolistic setting with fixed demand (in contrast to our model, in which demand depends on quality of service). In this paper they assume that all edges are owned by a single service provider, and focus on establishing the existence of an equilibrium and characterizing this equilibrium. More recently and independent of this work, the same authors extended their model to oligopolies, while still assuming that demand is fixed and delays are exclusively due to congestion, i.e., i (0) = 0 for all i (see [2] ). They thereby analyzed a special case of our model and proved a tight bound of 6/5 for the price of anarchy. Even more recently, following the original publication of the results in this paper, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar [1] extended their techniques to analyze the price of anarchy for our network pricing model, and proved a tight bound of 1.5 for it, thereby improving the results presented here. Along different lines, Vetta [24] shows a nice bound on the price of anarchy in a two-stage pricing game for facility location. In Vetta's game the players' strategies are the facilities they select, and prices are determined based on the facility locations, much as our prices determine the flow through the system.
There is a large body of economics literature dedicated to understanding the effects of pricing with service delays, with the focus being on establishing the existence of stable equilibria, and considering qualitative properties of equilibria (such as whether improved service leads to improved profit). Lee and Mason [18] consider the most closely related model with identical links and non-uniform users. More complex models are discussed in the recent papers by Allon and Federgruen [5] and Afèche [4] and their references. Just as in our work, these papers assume that user experience depends on a combination of price and delay, and that prices are set by selfish, income-maximizing players. However, these papers consider more complex environments, including heterogeneous users, and situations in which not only prices, but also delays can be used as strategic variables. However, unlike our work, these papers do not provide bounds on the quality degradation caused by selfish pricing.
Paper organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we prove that pure Nash equilibria always exist in this game. In doing so, we first prove a number of lemmas that will be useful throughout the paper. We present our main result in section 3, where we argue that the price of anarchy in this game is bounded by a small constant. In section 4, we consider alternate classes of disutility and latency functions. In particular, we show that pure equilibria may not exist if latencies are convex, although when they do, our price of anarchy result still applies. We also argue that in the presence of convex disutility, the price of anarchy may be unbounded.
Existence of pure equilibria
We start by proving that a given price vector induces a unique flow vector.
Lemma 1 For a given price vector p there is a unique flow vector f satisfying conditions 1 and 2 above.
Proof For a given value for disutility d, the total amount of flow F can be calculated in two ways. First, the disutility curve gives us the total flow value of u −1 (d). Second, on each individual link i, we know that the flow has to be max(
, and hence the total flow must be
Since disutility is decreasing, the first function is monotone decreasing in d. Furthermore, since latencies are strictly increasing and continuous, the second function is strictly increasing in d. Hence they must have a single intersection point.
We now establish some basic results concerning the monotonicity and continuity of this game. We first show that if a single player changes her link price, the flow induced by all players' prices changes in the natural way. In particular, if a player increases her price, the newly induced flow will route less traffic on her link, at least as much traffic on every other link, and less traffic in total. Similarly, the symmetric claims hold if the player decreases her price. More precisely we have 
The symmetric claim holds if player 1 reduces her price.
Proof We assume without loss of generality that there are at least two players with positive flow, since otherwise the claims are trivial.
1. Suppose the flow on link 1 does not decrease. Then, since the price increased, the disutility must strictly increase. Consider any other link that had positive flow. This link now has greater disutility, and since the price has not changed, must carry more flow. But this implies that both the disutility and total flow have increased, which is a contradiction. 2. Suppose some link i = 1 loses flow. Since p i is unchanged and latencies are strictly increasing, the disutility must strictly decrease. This implies that all links that carried flow must now carry less flow.
Since we know that link 1 loses flow, the total flow decreases. But then both the disutility and the total flow have decreased, which is a contradiction. 3. Finally, since flow on any link other than 1 can only increase, the disutility can only increase, and thus the total volume of flow can only decrease.
The next lemma argues that the amount of flow routed along any link is a continuous function of the players' prices.
Lemma 3 Let p be a price vector and let f i (p i ) be the amount of flow routed through link i as a function of p i (assuming all other prices in p are fixed). Then the function f i (p i ) is non-increasing and continuous for any p.
Proof The non-increasing part follows from Lemma 2. As for continuity, we again prove by contradiction. We argue that if there is a discontinuity, a small change in price can be found that violates monotonicity of disutility. For some price vector p let p i be a point of discontinuity of f i (·). Let f be the flow vector corresponding to the prices p with player i charging p i . Assume without loss of generality that f i (·) is upper-discontinuous at p i . Then there exists a small > 0 such that for any > 0, if player i increases p i by , the flow going through the i th link will decrease by at least (notice that it must decrease by Lemma 2). Since latencies are strictly monotone, the loss of at least flow decreases the latency on link i by at least some L > 0. Choose < L. Then if player i selects a price of p i + , the resulting latency will more than offset the increase in price. Thus the disutility will strictly decrease, contradicting Lemma 2.
Corollary 1 The profit
π i (p i ) = p i · f i (p i ) of
player i as a function of the price she chooses, given a fixed price vector p for the other players, is continuous for any p.
The next lemma argues that not only the profit of player i, but also that of any other player j changes continuously as i changes her price, while other players (including j) maintain their existing prices.
Lemma 4 The profit of any other player j as a function of the price chosen by player i (assuming that the other prices are fixed), is continuous and non-decreasing.
Proof The non-deceasing part follows from Lemma 2. Having shown that player profits depend continuously on the price of any player, we can extend this trivially to the following general profit continuity lemma. To prove that pure Nash equilibria exist, it is critical to relate the price charged by a content player to the flow she receives, and to the slopes of the latency and disutility functions. This is achieved through the following technical lemma, which also plays a key role in bounding the price of anarchy. 
where Proof The intuition behind the proof of this lemma is based on the following observations. At Nash equilibrium, player i must be content, and thus must not be able to benefit at all by unilaterally changing her price. The lemma follows from observing that, in particular, she will not benefit from very small changes to her price. Intuitively, the gain from an increase in price must be outweighed by the resulting loss of flow. In Fig. 3 the shaded boxes indicate the immediate effect of a player increasing or decreasing her price without taking into account the resulting change in flow of the other players. The actual resulting flow depends not only on player i's latency function, but also on the disutility curve (determining how much flow leaves the system altogether), and other players' latencies (determining how much of the flow of player i transfers to them; players with flatter latencies steal more flow than those with steeper latencies). For sufficiently small increases in price, the magnitude of this loss is dictated solely by the local slopes of these curves, resulting in the first inequality. Likewise, the second inequality follows by considering a small decrease in price. More formally, let us prove the second inequality. Assume that player i decreases her price so that the system disutility is decreased by a tiny amount δ > 0. Then for a player j ∈ L + , the flow on her link will decrease by δ/a j and the total flow in the system will increase by −δ/v + . 1 Hence player i's flow must increase by
This increase in flow will result in a latency increase of
. So i must decrease her price by
We now use the fact that player i is content again to prove that for any > 0, there exists a small enough δ such that,
Thus player i could obtain more profit by setting her price to p i − p i , because her new profit would be
we choose δ small enough to ensure that f i > p i (which we can do due to continuity of latencies and disutility). But this can not happen, since player i was content. Thus in the limit of δ approaching 0 we get
Therefore as δ tends to 0,
The proof for the first inequality is analogous, with one minor exception. The proof begins by considering the effect of player i increasing her price by a small amount. However, unlike the above case, this might expand the set of flow-carrying links; any link j for which j (0) + p j = d will start carrying flow when the system disutility increases. This is why we have to expand the set of links under the sum from L + to L 0 .
We can now analyze the best response function β :
This function maps a price vector p to another price vector β(p), such that β i (p) maximizes player i's
profit assuming all other players price as in p. We define player i's best response to be p i = 0 if there is no price at which i can derive a positive profit. We use Lemma 6 to show that a player's best response is unique, and hence β(p) is well defined. This and the continuity of β(·), which is shown in Lemma 8, are sufficient to prove the existence of pure equilibria.
Lemma 7 For any set of existing prices p, each players' best response exists and is unique (and hence β(p) is well defined).
Proof First, due to the fact that profit is a continuous function on a closed interval, there is at least one best response. Now suppose that the best response for some player i is not unique, and let p i > p i be two best response prices for player i. Let f and f be the corresponding flow vectors when player i selects prices p i and p i , respectively, while all players j = i leave their prices as given by p. Let F and F denote the corresponding total flows under these two price vectors. Let L = {j|j = i, j (0) + p j < u(F )}. Thus, L denotes the set of flow-carrying links (excluding i) under the price p i for player i. Next we define L = {j|j = i, j (0) + p j ≤ u(F )}. The set L includes the all links except for i that will carry positive flow if player i were to charge a price of p i + for arbitrarily small > 0. Lemma 
implies that f i < f i , F < F , and hence u(F ) > u(F ). This implies that L ⊇ L . Let v denote the right slope of u(·) at F and v denote left slope of u(·) at F . By concavity of u(·), v ≥ v (recall that both values are negative). Taken together, these inequalities imply
Since both p i and p i are best responses for player i, we can apply Lemma 6 to both sides of this inequality:
This is a contradiction, and thus a player's best response must be unique.
Lemma 8 The best response function β(p) is continuous in p.
Proof It is sufficient to argue that β(·) is continuous for each player in each coordinate of the price vector. Assume not. Let p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) be a price vector for which player j's best response changes discontinuously when player i changes her price by an arbitrary small amount. Let β j (.) denote the best response for player j as a function of the price set by player i while all other players maintain their prices as given by p. Also, let us use π j (.) to denote the profit that player j gathers with her best response price as a function of the price set by player i (again assuming all other players set prices as given by p). Then, discontinuity implies that there exists a sequence of prices
, such that the best response for player j to these prices
There are two cases to consider: β j (p i ) = 0 and β j (p i ) = 0. In the former case, Lemma 7 implies that when player i charges p i , player j gets a strictly higher profit π j (p i ) by charging β j (p i ) than by charging β . Let π be the profit that player j gathers by charging β when player i charges a price of p i , and let
Consider what happens when player i changes her price from p i to p i for some . Since profits are continuous in prices, once is sufficiently large, player j obtains a profit within /3 of π j (p i ) by charging β j (p i ). Similarly, for sufficiently large , player j gathers a profit within /3 of π by charging her best response price β j (p i ), since this price can be made arbitrarily close to β . But this implies that for sufficiently large , when player i charges p i , player j can gather at least /3 more profit by charging β j (p i ) than by charging β j (p i ). But this contradicts the definition of β j (·).
We now consider the case when β j (p i ) = 0. Notice that this would only be possible if j (0) ≥ d, the current system disutility, since otherwise player j could obtain nonzero profit by charging a sufficiently small price. Furthermore, if j (0) > d, the price vector p can not cause a discontinuity for player j, since disutility depends continuously on the price of player i, and thus a suitably small change in p i will still fail to gather any profit. Thus
We know that a sufficiently small change in player i's price yields an arbitrarily small change in the system disutility (since flows are continuous in prices). Player j's best response can be no greater than this change in system disutility, and thus this too can be made arbitrarily close to 0. Hence the best response of player j is continuous in the price of player i.
Since there is a maximum price P such that any player charging above P gathers no profit, we can restrict our attention on β(·) to the convex and compact region [0, P] k . Thus we can apply Brouwer's fixed point theorem and thereby prove the following.
Theorem 1 The network pricing game has a Nash equilibrium.

Price of anarchy
In this section we prove our main result, namely that selfish behavior on the part of the players yields a social utility that is within a small constant factor of optimal. More formally, we prove
Theorem 1 The price of anarchy for the network pricing game is at most 4.65.
Consider a general instance of the game with prices at some Nash equilibrium p. We show that the social welfare under prices p is close to that of an optimal solution, and this implies the above theorem. As a first step, we create a modified game instance with the following two properties. First, having players set prices p is still an equilibrium. Second, the ratio of the social welfare of the optimal solution in the new game to that of this equilibrium does not decrease. In particular, this modification involves considering the outcome at equlibrium prices p, and altering the demand curve so as to eliminate user surplus, as shown in Fig. 4 . As a result of this modification, we can bound the social utility of an optimal solution solely against the player profit at Nash equilibria.
We consider a general instance of the game with disutility function u and latencies i (·) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We assume we have a price vector p at Nash equilibrium, with induced flow vector f , total flow volume F and disutility d.
Lemma 1 Define a new disutility curve, which we refer to as the truncated disutility curve
Then prices p are also at Nash equilibrium under this truncated disutility curve, and the price of anarchy of this instance has not decreased.
Proof Suppose player i has an incentive to decrease her price. This would generate an increased total flow F > F, and thus yield the same level of disutility under both u(x) and w(x). Thus player i would gather a profit that was achievable under u(x) via the same deviation. But we assumed that p was at equilibrium for u(x), so this can not be an improving move for i. Now suppose player i has an incentive to increase her price. Doing so would cause a decrease in player i's flow under both u(x) and w(x). However, the decrease in flow is clearly greater under the truncated disutility curve. Thus, if such a move was not profitable before truncation, it is certainly not profitable after truncation.
As for the price of anarchy, note that this truncation destroys the user surplus of the given equilibrium, as shown in Fig. 4 . But this lost utility is also an upper bound on the decrease in the social utility of the new optimal solution under the truncated disutility curve. Thus the price of anarchy can only increase.
From this point on, we assume that the disutility curve has been truncated with respect to the Nash equilibrium we intend to bound. Notice that due to the truncated nature of the disutility curves, if a player obtains no profit at Nash equilibrium, then her latency at zero must have been larger than d. Thus, she does not participate in the optimal solution either. So without loss of generality, we can assume that all players obtain non-zero profit at the Nash equilibrium, and can restate the second condition of Lemma 6 as follows:
The next lemma provides a simple lower bound on the price that players charge at equilibrium, both in terms of the system disutility d and their own latency function. This result is helpful in proving a lower bound on player profits at the Nash equilibrium. Proof For simplicity, we assume we have a truncated disutility curve, although the lemma is also true without this assumption. Define q = d − b i . We claim that if player i charged p i < q 2 , then she can increase her profit by charging
However, since we are assuming a truncated disutility curve, in charging We now prove our main result. We consider an instance of our game with equilibrium prices p, and corresponding flow vector f , total flow F, and disutility d. We assume that our disutility function u(x) is truncated as in Lemma 1, i.e., u(x) = d on the interval [0, F], and thus U(p) is represented entirely by player profit.
Proof of Theorem 1 As observed, in our truncated instance of the game, the given Nash equilibrium generates no user surplus. Thus we must bound both the player profit and the user surplus of the optimal solution against the profit of the players at Nash equilibrium. We consider an optimal price vector p * , with corresponding flows f * , F * , and disutility value d * . We can trivially bound the user surplus of the optimal solution by F * · (d − d * ), and we can attribute f * i · (d − d * ) of this bound to each player i. Thus we can think of each player i in the optimal solution as contributing π
We first partition the players by the slope of their latencies. More precisely, let us call a player steep if
. Otherwise, we say a player is shallow. We now argue that there is at most one shallow player. Then we will show that the contribution of a steep player i to the optimal solution can be bounded in terms of π i . Finally, we consider two cases regarding the shallow player's latency. In both cases, we show that the contribution of this shallow player to the optimal solution can be bounded within a constant factor of the sum of the profits of all the players at Nash equilibrium.
Intuitively, the reason why there is only a single shallow player is that if there were two (or more), then one of them would have an incentive to reduce her price slightly, since the amount of extra flow she gains by stealing from the other shallow player(s) would far outweigh the slight decrease in her price. More formally, let v + be the right slope of u(x) at F. Consider any shallow player i.
By Equation 3, we know that (
Since i is shallow, the first term is greater than
. But v + is negative, so for all j = i we must have a j > p i 2f i > a i , as otherwise the above inequality would be violated. This implies that i must have the unique minimum slope, and thus i must be the only shallow player.
Consider a steep player j. The optimal solution can not gather more value than π j by charging more than p j , as then the player could selfishly do the same. Thus we only need to consider how the optimal solution might benefit by having p * j < p j . By assumption, a j ≥ 5 ). Thus nearly all players gather almost as much utility as they would in an optimal solution. Now we are left with the task of bounding the value gathered by the shallow player i in the optimal solution. Due to the truncated structure of the demand curve, we know that to gather more value with player i, the optimal solution must charge a lower price and carry more flow; any value realized when player i charges a higher price could have also been gathered as profit by the player at equilibrium. Thus our concern is that somehow the optimal solution sends a huge amount of flow at a lower price on i, thereby gathering substantially larger social utility. We consider two cases, based on just how shallow i's latency is.
Case 1:
. In this case the latency is not very shallow. We can get a loose upper bound on the maximum contribution of player i to the optimal solution by ignoring all other players and assuming u(x) = d (since the actual truncated disutility curve eventually drops off to zero, this assumption only increases the value that can be gathered). Then the best choice for i is to charge . Since the slope of i's latency is shallow, the disutility curve must be relatively steep, as otherwise, i could decrease p i slightly and dramatically increase f i . More precisely, Eq. 3 implies that
. Since u(x) is concave, the area in A can be upper bounded by a triangle of height p i and slope v + . This has area at most p i · f i = π i .
To bound B, we partition the steep players (all j = i) into two classes. Let S − be the set of all players j for whom b j > i (f i ) + p i /2, and let S + consist of all remaining steep players, as shown in Fig. 6b . Define F − and F + to be the total flow carried by all players in S − and S + respectively at equilibrium. By Lemma 2, we know that for any player j ∈ S + , p j ≥ (d − b j )/2, and hence the total profit of all players in S + is at least p i F + /4. Furthermore, we can argue that S − must be small, as if it was very large, player i would have an incentive to undercut all the players in S − . In particular, we claim that F − ≤ 3f i . Otherwise, player i would have an incentive to charge a quarter of her current price. Due to the above shallowness condition on her latency, she is guarranteed to more than quadruple her flow before any player in S − routes any traffic. Clearly this would generate more profit, contradicting our assumption of equilibrium. Thus we can bound the total area of B by 4π i + 4 j =i π j .
The combined area of A and B is thus at most 5π i + 4 j =i π j , and hence the optimal solution can gather a value of no more than 5π i +5.125 j =i π j . Thus the price of anarchy is at most 5.125.
The promised bound of 4.65 is obtained by rebalancing the different bounds obtained for the different cases in the above proof. First, observe that when the slope of the shallow player was not very shallow (Case 1 of the above proof), the bound we obtained was 3.52, which is significantly smaller 5.125. Furthermore, returning to our bound on the area of B, note that we can generalize our definition of S − to be the set of all players j for whom b j > i (f i ) + αp i for some real α, and define S + similarly. Parametrizing over the slope of the shallow player a used to distinguish between Case 1 and Case 2, as well as the α, we can try to minimize the maximum of the bounds obtained for the different cases. In particular, if we set a = 0.06 and α = 0.43, we get the desired bound of 4.65 for the price of anarchy. 2 For the special case when i (0) = 0 for all i, a proof similar to the one above yields the following Theorem 2 The price of anarchy of the network pricing game with a concave disutility curve and linear latencies of the form i (x) = a i x is bounded by 3.125.
Proof The argument mostly follows along the lines of the proof of Theorem 1. As before, there can be at most a single shallow player i and we can bound the value gathered by the optimal solution from the steep players by 1.125 j =i π j . As for the shallow player, we again split her potential profit into areas A and B. Again, the area of A is at most π i , but unlike in the proof of Theorem 1, we can give a simpler bound for the area B. Indeed, Lemma 2 implies that the area of B is at most π i +2 j =i π j , since 2 We also need to observe that instead of area A, we can use the smaller area of We conclude the section by presenting a single player instance of our game where the price of anarchy is 3/2. We then show that this bound it tight when there is only a single player by demonstrating a matching upper bound.
Observation 1
There exists a 1-player instance of the network pricing game with linear latencies and concave disutility curve which has a price of anarchy of 3/2.
Proof Consider the disutility curve u(x) = 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and u(x) = 2 − x for 1 ≤ x ≤ 2 and let the player have zero latency (see Fig. 7a ). Then she would obtain maximal profit of 1 by charging a price of 1 for a social value of 1. Yet the optimal solution can gather a social value of 3/2 by charging 0. Hence the lower bound. Finally, it is not difficult to slightly modify this example to ensure strict monotonicity of latency curves.
Observation 2
The network pricing game with a single player has a price of anarchy of at most 3/2.
Proof As in the proof of the main theorem, we shall assume truncated disutility curves. We also assume without loss of generality that p = f = 1 for the single player (we can achieve this by rescaling the axes). As before, the only way that the optimal solution can obtain more social value than the equilibrium is by charging a lower price. Hence a trivial upper bound on the social value of the optimum is 1 + r 1 (u(x) − (x))dx, where r is the intersection point of u(·) and (·) (see Fig. 7b ). The area of the integral can be bounded by the triangular area bounded by the slopes a and v + of the latency and disutility curves. Lemma 6 tells us that a − v + ≥ 1 (recall that v + was negative), so the area of the triangle is at most 1/2.
Extensions and related models
In this section we analyze what happens to the network pricing game when we relax the assumptions on the latency functions and the disutility curve. First, we consider convex, as opposed to linear, latency functions, while retaining concave disutility. Unfortunately, the network pricing game with convex latencies and concave disutility curve may not have a Nash equilibrium as illustrated by the following 2-player example. Let the disutility curve be u(x) = 1. Define the player latencies as follows.
We claim that this instance of the game has no Nash equilibrium. Indeed, at an equilibrium the first player can not obtain profit from the first third of the flow, since otherwise the second player would undercut him. Hence first player's best option must be to charge a price of 1 for a profit of 2 3 . Yet this would induce the second player to charge a high price as well, which in turn would create an incentive for the first player to undercut the second one slightly and obtain a larger profit. Although the above example violates continuity and strict monotonicity of the latency functions and the disutility curve, it is not difficult to alter it slightly so as to satisfy these conditions while still maintaining the nonexistence of Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, when such a network pricing game does have a Nash equilibrium, the proofs of the previous sections can be extended to yield the same bounds on the price of anarchy. We next consider instances of the game with convex, instead of concave, disutility curves, while maintaining convex latencies. An example similar to the one above can be constructed to show that this game may still not have a Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, unlike the game with concave disutility curves, even when Nash equilibria do exist, we do not have any such bounds, since as the following single player example illustrates, there exist instances of the game with unbounded gap between the social utility of a Nash equilibrium and an optimal solution.
Theorem 1 If an instance of the network pricing game with convex latencies and concave disutility has a Nash
Example 1 Consider an instance of the game with a single player who has zero latency, and a disutility curve u(x) = 2 − x when 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and u(x) = 1 x otherwise (see Fig. 8 ). The equilibrium strategy for the player is to charge any price above 1 for a profit of 1 and finite social utility, yet charging a price of 0 yields and infinite social benefit.
